The vast amounts of fossil fuels available and the forecasts regarding their future utilisation can make carbon capture and storage/sequestration (CCS) an attractive option, despite the various challenges associated with the technology. In order to be viable, many CCS projects will have to be transboundary, in the sense that CO2 will be stored in a country other than from where it was captured. The most attractive, or even the only available, storage option is often offshore. However, export of CO2 for sub-seabed storage is prohibited as dumping by the 1996 London Protocol. An amendment to the Protocol that enables export was adopted in 2009, but is unlikely to enter into force. The article analyses the implications of this situation and explores possible options for States that see export of CO2 for sub-seabed storage as an important policy option.
Introduction
It is well established that the globally available fossil fuel resources contain far more CO2 than could be emitted without entailing a high risk of catastrophic climate disruptions. 1 The carbon embedded in oil and gas reserves Against this background it should be no surprise that capturing part of the CO2 generated when burning fossil fuels and pumping it into the ground, i.e., carbon capture and storage/sequestration (CCS),7 can seem to be an attractive option, despite being a costly and cumbersome technology that facilitates continued dependence on fossil fuel. The International Energy Agency (IEA) puts this in more positive terms: it assesses CCS as being the only technology available today that has the potential to protect the climate while preserving the value of fossil fuel reserves and existing infrastructure. 8 Whether deployment of CCS is desirable or not largely depends on whether one considers that sufficient reductions in CO2 emissions will be attainable in its absence, i.e., mainly through the swift replacement of fossil fuels by other energy sources and gains in energy efficiency. Although CCS has many critics,9 the IEA sees it as a critical component in a portfolio of low-carbon energy technologies if governments decide to undertake ambitious measures to combat climate change.10 In a similar vein, the European Parliament has described CCS as "necessary in particular for decarbonising high CO2-emitting industries".11
However, despite support from key climate policy actors, CCS is struggling to attract sufficient interest from industry and investors. In fact, the technology is facing several challenges: the most severe is probably the lack of a clear 7 In essence, CCS is a collective name for several partly alternative techniques and methods which, when combined, allow CO2 from combustion processes to be sequestered and thus prevented from reaching the atmosphere. Technically, it comprises three main stages: capturing the CO2 (pre-or post-combustion), transporting it to a suitable storage site and final storage/disposal. For each step, different potential technical solutions of varying economic and engineering feasibility exist. An elaborate description of the technical options may be found in: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, prepared by Working Group III of the IPCC (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 ). An up-to-date assessment of the status of the various technologies is provided in IEA (n 2). 8 IEA (n 2) at p. 8. business case for investing in CCS in most jurisdictions,12 at least outside the context of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) with CO2,13 where storage is incidental to rather than the purpose of the operation.14 But cost is not everything. Significant problems also pertain to public perception,15 and to various regulatory and other policy factors.16 Despite much attention having been paid to the legal framework for CCS,17 the regulatory environment still creates significant obstacles and uncertainties that add to the perceived precariousness of investing in CCS. One significant obstacle, which has attracted surprisingly little qualified analysis,18 considering both its practical implications and its more conceptual dimensions, relates to the ability to transport captured CO2 across State borders for final storage under the jurisdiction of a State other than the one where the CO2 was captured. If such storage is intended to take place in a sub-seabed storage site, the export of the CO2 is in many cases prohibited under international law, despite much activity, and increasing political agreement, to change this situation. This article does not engage with the wider issue of where and when, if ever, CCS is a preferable policy option. It examines the problem that this ban on export of CO2 for sub-seabed storage may pose to States and other actors who do find CCS a necessary or at least a desirable part of their climate change mitigation policy. Before addressing this issue in more detail, some brief remarks are made about what may be termed the transboundary dimension of CCS, including why export of captured CO2 to offshore storage areas may in some regions be the key to making CCS viable.
Pertinent Dimensions of CCS

Export of Captured CO2
In some regions, including the United States and China, domestically available capacity for storing CO2 is likely to be extensive and widely distributed, and hence limit the need for long-distance and transboundary transport of captured CO2. In other regions, including Western/Northern Europe, Japan, and Korea, there may be a strong need for linking CO2 point sources with (often offshore) potential storage sites over larger distances and also across State boundaries.19 Irrespective of storage capacity, the need to attain a sufficient scale for any CCS project to make financial sense may also necessitate the linking of emissions sources across national boundaries.20
Offshore CO2 Storage
Although the costs associated with sub-seabed storage are generally higher than for storage on land, the legal preconditions for storing CO2 below the seabed can become pertinent for a number of reasons. The first is that it may be the only available storage option. In some regions the majority of estimated storage capacity is found offshore.21 In other cases, offshore storage may be the most viable option from a policy perspective due, inter alia, to issues of safety and, not least, public perception. If leakage were to occur from a storage operation, humans would be less affected by an offshore than by an onshore storage.22 It is thus logical that offshore storage also seems to be perceived less negatively than onshore storage by the general public.23 Because the NIMBY syndrome does not apply offshore, far from populated areas, such storage operations are less likely to trigger strong public opposition. In sum, offshore storage is in many cases either the only physically available option, or at least the only politically feasible one, if CO2 is to be captured and stored.
Preliminary Remarks on the Regulation of Sub-Seabed CO2 Storage
The current analysis focuses on CO2 storage in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is the type of sub-seabed storage that is, for the foreseeable future, of most practical relevance.24 The EEZ is in many respects open to all States. 25 This gives even geographically local risks a very tangible international dimension. The irreducible interconnectedness of the various parts of the oceans due to the constant movement of the water itself and many of its inhabitants also contributes to making risks and harm to the marine environment in the EEZ an immediate concern to others than the coastal State. Therefore sub-seabed storage of CO2 is subject to much more extensive regulation under international law compared to onshore storage. 26 Many pieces of international law may come into play when offshore storage is considered. In addition to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),27 various pieces of marine environmental law, waste law and biodiversity law become pertinent.28 However, it is the regulation of marine dumping that has attracted most attention, primarily because the international dumping regime has been seen not only as constituting an effective obstacle to the utilisation of important storage capacity, but also as an appropriate framework for managing the risks to the marine environment associated with sub-seabed storage.29 Due to its continued far-reaching implications for offshore CO2 storage, the regime on marine dumping is also the subject of this analysis, albeit with a particular focus on its implications for transboundary movements (export) of CO2 for sub-seabed storage.
At the global level, marine dumping is foremost addressed by the 1972 London Dumping Convention30 and its 1996 Protocol.31 However, the systemic logic requires these agreements to be viewed in the light of the more general provisions of the LOSC.
Dumping in the Law of the Sea Convention
States are required, under LOSC Article 210, to adopt laws and regulations, as well as to take other measures as may be necessary, to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment by dumping.32 The LOSC also makes it clear that dumping within the territorial sea and the EEZ or on the continental shelf may not be carried out without the express prior approval of the coastal State, which has the right to permit, regulate and control such dumping after due consideration of the matter with other States which by reason of their geographical situation may be adversely affected thereby.33 That Article 210 28 For an overview of the role of international law in the regulation of CCS, including subseabed CO2 storage, see Langlet (n 26 does not amount to an outright ban is clear both from its wording, according to which reduction (as opposed to complete prevention) is a legitimate policy, and from the fact that it makes provision for coastal States to permit and regulate dumping.
Whether the injection of CO2 into the seabed for permanent storage is to be considered dumping at all in this regard is not obvious from the LOSC which, as far as is relevant here, defines dumping as "any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea".34 Reasonable arguments can be made both for including and excluding it from the definition.35 It can, e.g., be debated whether injection into the sub-seabed is disposal 'at sea' , or if that implies that the dumping occurs in the water column or onto the seabed.
The LOSC provides for the global and regional elaboration of further international rules and standards consistent with itself, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment.36 With respect to 'pollution by dumping' , it is particularly explicit by stipulating that "States . . . shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control such pollution".37 These rules and standards are to be re-examined from time to time as necessary. Article 210 also states that national laws, regulations and measures must be no less effective in preventing, reducing and controlling pollution of the marine environment by dumping than the global rules and standards,38 thus establishing that the global standards are to define the obligations that apply to all of the LOSC's Parties, not only those that are explicitly bound by such rules as Parties to specific regional or sectoral agreements.39
This call for adopting more elaborate international rules on dumping had actually been heeded already before the adoption of the LOSC through the adoption of the 1972 London Dumping Convention. The LOSC itself 34 Ibid., at Art. 1 (1) (1) Still, this strongly suggests that at least the London Convention serves as an elaboration of the pertinent provisions in the LOSC, and in fact becomes determinative of what constitutes dumping also with regard to the regime established by the LOSC itself.42 As a consequence the LOSC itself could hardly be more restrictive than the London Convention. We therefore turn our attention to the London Convention and its Protocol without thereby risking overlooking more demanding standards on dumping enshrined in the LOSC.
The London Convention and Its Protocol
Adopted in 1972, the London Dumping Convention was the first instrument to address marine dumping at an international level. Subject to some exceptions, dumping includes, as far as is relevant for current purposes, "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea".43 The London Convention bans the dumping of The definitions and delimitations of the London Convention have led to considerable discussion and disagreement between the Parties as to whether and how the prohibition on dumping is relevant to sub-seabed injection of CO2.46 Among other things it is not obvious that CO2 is covered by Annex I, although it does seem reasonable to consider it to fall under the heading of 'industrial waste' .47 It may also be argued that injection of CO2 into the seabed does not constitute dumping 'at sea' as understood in the London Convention.48
Over the years the London Convention came to be seen as rather outdated. Among its flaws was that it does not incorporate the precautionary principle. It was also increasingly perceived as lacking a sufficient basis in science.49 These and other perceived deficiencies led, in 1996, to the adoption of a Protocol to the London Convention which in fact amounts to a completely new instrument superseding the 1972 London Convention for those Parties for which the Protocol has entered into force.50 The Protocol has, at the end of 2014, 45 Parties, whereas the Convention has 87.51 Among the Parties to the Protocol are Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Republic of Korea, 44 Ibid., at Art. IV 1. 45 A permit should only be issued after careful consideration of all the factors set forth in Annex III, including characteristics and composition of the matter and characteristics of dumping site and method of deposit. The 1996 Protocol differs from the London Convention in a number of significant ways. Most important is perhaps that the previous 'permitted-unless-prohibited' approach to dumping is replaced by a general prohibition on dumping of any material or substance of any kind, with specific exceptions set out in an Annex.53 Such 'reversed listing' was, at the time of the Protocol's adoption, already applied by several regional marine agreements, including the OSPAR54 and Helsinki Conventions.55 Of particular relevance to CCS operations is that 'dumping' , as defined in the Protocol, covers any deliberate disposal into the sea of material or substances from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea, as well as any storage of material or substance in the seabed and the subsoil thereof from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea.56 It is thus clear that geological storage of CO2 in the sub-seabed constitutes dumping under the Protocol.
Enabling Sub-seabed Storage of CO2
Already before the entry into force of the London Protocol it was recognised that the international dumping regime was highly relevant for the issue of sequestration of CO2 in the sub-seabed, and the Parties to the London Convention agreed in 2004 that the consistency with the London Convention and the Protocol of such CO2 sequestration required further consideration.57 This work eventually resulted in an amendment being adopted by the first Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol in November 2006, whereby CO2 sequestration in sub-seabed geological formations was added to the Protocol's Annex 1, i.e., to the substances that may be considered for dumping subject to a The Parties to the regional OSPAR Convention, aimed at protecting the environment of the North-East Atlantic, took a similar step, deciding in 2007 to amend the pertinent annexes to the OSPAR Convention, so as to enable CO2 storage in the sub-seabed.63 The OSPAR Parties also adopted guidelines on risk assessment and management of CO2 storage activities.64
Amending the Protocol to Enable Export of CO2 for Storage
As our foremost interest here is with the transboundary elements of CCS, the most important provision in the Protocol is Article 6, according to which "Contracting Parties shall not allow the export of wastes or other matter to other countries for dumping or incineration at sea". This provision has given rise to some discussion as to its significance for different kinds of transboundary movements of CO2, either before or after injection into the sub-seabed. The Working Group also considered transboundary migration of CO2 streams in the sub-seabed. With respect to deliberate migration across boundaries, it reached no conclusion as to whether such migration would constitute export within the terms of Article 6. There was, however, general agreement that unintended migration of CO2 streams within sub-seabed geological formations would not constitute export. 68 However, at the subsequent Meeting of the Parties, opinions differed as to whether the report of the Working Group constituted a sufficient basis for amending Article 6. There was also no consensus on the need for an amendment or whether an interpretative resolution would be sufficient. Against this background the meeting established an intersessional correspondence group to consider, inter alia, the option of an amendment of Article 6.69 In addition to setting up this group, the Meeting of the Parties in December 2008 endorsed the recommendation to "give the political signal that the London Protocol should not constitute a barrier to the transboundary movement of CO2 streams", but that further work would be needed to achieve the best political and legal solution. China issued a statement saying that the issue of CO2 sequestration in transboundary sub-seabed geological formations "has many complicated legal and technical implications, the deep and thorough study and discussion of which still need to be carried out by all countries" and making clear that it was "not in favour of adoption of the proposed amendment to Article 6 in a hasty manner".76 The statement also expresses concern that the export of CO2 might open a door for export of other wastes in contradiction with the objective of the London Protocol.77 The adopted amendment allows for export of CO2 streams for disposal provided that an agreement or arrangement has been entered into by the countries concerned. Such an agreement or arrangement is to include "confirmation and allocation of permitting responsibilities between the exporting and receiving countries, consistent with the provisions of [the] Protocol and other applicable international law".78 In the case of export to non-Parties to the Protocol, the agreement or arrangement must contain provisions at a minimum equivalent to those of the Protocol, including those relating to the issuance of permits and permit conditions for complying with the provisions of Annex 2, to ensure that the agreement or arrangement does not derogate from the obligations of Contracting Parties under the Protocol to protect and preserve the marine environment.79 , 80 It is emphasised in the Resolution that Contracting Parties should ensure that the long-distance export of CO2 streams between UN regions is reduced to the minimum consistent with the protection and preservation of the marine environment from all sources of pollution, taking into account the special 74 position of developing countries.81 The Resolution also reaffirms the previous conclusion by the Legal and Technical Working Group that the transboundary movement of CO2 after injection (i.e., migration) is not export for dumping and therefore not prohibited by Article 6.82 In 2013 the Meeting of the Parties also adopted the Guidance on the implementation of article 6.2 on the export of carbon dioxide streams for disposal in sub-seabed geological formations for the purpose of sequestration, subject to the entry into force of the amendment to Article 6.83
The Continued Tribulations of CO2 Export
The legal obstacles to transboundary movement of CO2 for sub-seabed storage were not resolved by the mere adoption of the amendment resolution. Whereas amendments to annexes-such as the one that added CO2 sequestration in sub-seabed geological formations to Annex 1 of the Protocol-become binding on all Parties that do not issue a declaration stating their non-acceptance of the amendment,84 any amendment to the Protocol as such requires acceptance by two-thirds of the Contracting Parties for it to enter into force, and then it only binds those Parties that have accepted it.85 However, five years after the adoption of the amendment, only Norway and Great Britain had submitted such an acceptance with respect to the amendment to Article 6.86 According to the IEA, a significant number of the Parties to the Protocol take a limited interest in CCS; furthermore, among those that do engage with CCS policy issues, not all are interested in offshore CO2 storage or CO2 export for such storage. It is thus likely that many Parties give a low priority to ratification The bleak prospect of the amendment coming into force has given rise to a discussion on whether there are measures other than the acceptance and formal entry into force of the amendment that may enable Parties to export CO2 for sub-seabed geological storage without breaching their obligations under the Protocol.
Exporting CO2 without an Amendment
The position initially held by a few Parties that export would not be contrary to Article 6 of the Protocol must now be deemed completely refuted, not least since the Parties reaffirmed that the export of CO2 waste streams is prohibited until the amendment enters into force.88 But this does not preclude that there may be measures other than formal acceptance of the amendment by a sufficient number of Parties that could enable captured CO2 to be exported for sub-seabed geological storage. The IEA, which sees CCS as a critical component in a portfolio of low-carbon energy technologies,89 published a 'working paper' in 2011 that explores such different options.90 The paper sets out six options, namely: The reasoning provided for the different options is at times rather meagre. However, some of the options warrant more serious consideration than others.
Exporting to or with Non-parties
The sixth option of the IEA working paper, i.e., exporting CO2 to or with noncontracting Parties to the 1996 Protocol, is dealt with very briefly, and for good reason. Despite the apparent position of one or a few Parties, nothing in the wording of Article 6 (". . . shall not allow the export of wastes or other matter to other countries . . .") suggests that the prohibition would not apply to export to non-Parties. Such an interpretation has also been clearly rejected by many Parties.91 Even these strong legal objections aside, the utility of such an option would be limited, because many of the Parties that may have an interest in engaging in export as part of regional CCS solutions are largely surrounded by other Parties and would thus gain little from this 'option' .92 Exporting captured CO2 further afield is probably out of the question in most cases for both practical (e.g., cost) and political reasons.93
Adoption of an Interpretative Resolution
The working paper's first option, adoption by the Parties of an interpretative resolution, is also of limited practical interest. It draws on the fact that, according to Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),94 when interpreting a treaty provision "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" is to be taken into account, together with the context. That the wording of Article 6 does not appear to be very ambiguous is not necessarily a problem, as subsequent practice has been found to affect the interpretation 91 LC 30/16 (n 67), para. 5.14. 92 Such is, e.g., the situation around the North Sea (where Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Norway are all Parties) and to a slightly lesser extent in the Baltic Sea area (where Denmark, Estonia, Germany and Sweden all are Parties; Finland lacks geological conditions suitable for CO2 storage). of other, also apparently rather clear, treaty provisions.95 Subsequent practice has also been found to be able to affect the interpretation of more technical, as well as more value-oriented, provisions.96 However, even assuming that such an agreement would be able to establish an interpretation of Article 6 that allows export of CO2 for sub-seabed storage, the fact still remains that several Parties have rejected an interpretative declaration as an adequate basis for regulating CO2 sequestration in sub-seabed geological formations.97 Furthermore, as the IEA's working paper also points out, the fact that the Parties have initiated a formal amendment procedure indicates that they consider Article 6 to prohibit export for sub-seabed storage.98 There can hence be little doubt that the Parties consider a prohibition to be in force. If an attempt would nonetheless be made to have an interpretative resolution adopted, consensus among the Parties would be required.99 Considering that China voted against the adoption of the amendment in the first place-although expressing its support for facilitating export for sub-seabed storage in principle-and that other Parties abstained,100 this consensus may be very hard to attain. In sum it must be concluded that having resort to an interpretative resolution is not a viable option, at least not unless the Parties unanimously act in such a way as to make it clear that they all agree with a new interpretation of Article 6.
A Subsequent Agreement
The IEA paper's third option, the conclusion of a subsequent agreement, is perhaps the most promising one. It has the advantage of not requiring unanimity among the Parties. In fact it even acknowledges that different Parties may wish different rules to apply in relation to export, at least for the moment.
According to the relevant rules on the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter, a new agreement between some of the Parties to the London Protocol could change the legal obligations between them, e.g., by allowing export of CO2 for sub-seabed storage as between those Parties. In relation to the Parties to the London Protocol that were not Parties to such a subsequent agreement, the Protocol would still apply as before.101 The major issue here, which is not seriously addressed in the IEA paper, is the nature of the obligation owed towards those States that remain Parties only to the Protocol. The IEA paper finds it "difficult to see how a subsequent agreement enabling export of CO2 streams for disposal in accordance with Annex 1 and consistent with the 2009 amendment could be perceived as depriving a contracting party of its rights under the London Protocol. The rights of other contracting parties are unlikely to be affected, except perhaps if CO2 streams are transported through their territory . . ."102
This conclusion presupposes that the Protocol only aims to protect, and thus only establishes obligations relating to, the right of individual Parties not to have substances intended for dumping exported to them. Little supports such a view. In effect the Protocol is what is commonly referred to as an 'interdependent' treaty, i.e., one in which the rights and obligations of the treaty cannot be reduced to reciprocal rights and obligations between any two Parties.103 The movement of the water of the sea and its inhabitants makes pollution of the sea, e.g., by dumping, a potential concern for more than just the State in whose maritime zone the dumping occurs. As regards the EEZ, that argument is further strengthened by the rights enjoyed in that zone by other States than the coastal State. It can hence not be assumed that the obligations set out in the Protocol are only intended to protect the interests of the State in whose waters any particular act of dumping would occur.
Admittedly, prohibiting export for dumping is different than prohibiting or regulating dumping as such. It could be that the intention with this particular export-related obligation is only to protect the State to which the export may be destined. However, little suggests that to be the case. The overall intention of the Parties, as stated in the preamble to the Protocol, is to protect the marine environment and to promote the sustainable use and conservation of marine resources.104 Rights or interests of particular States are not mentioned. Furthermore, no other intention underlying the export ban in Article 6 is mentioned either. Article 6 is a general export ban, without any distinction being made between, e.g., Parties and non-Parties, or between developed and developing States, as might be expected if, for example, the interests of particularly vulnerable States were to be protected by the ban.
The discussion on export within the dumping regime was much influenced by the developments under the Basel Convention.105 However, the idea of banning export emerged even before the adoption of that Convention as a potential means of preventing circumvention of the prohibition on dumping by exporting waste to non-Parties.106 When such a prohibition was eventually given legally binding force, as Article 6 in the Protocol, it took the form of a general export ban, without any distinction between different categories of States. Against this background it is hard to sustain an argument that the export ban, as opposed to the ban on dumping as such, would be an obligation that is owed only in respect to each State to which export might take place.
However, it should be recalled that the amendment to Article 6 only allows export to other Parties to the Protocol or, in the case of non-Parties, requires that export occur only in accordance with an agreement or arrangement containing provisions at a minimum equivalent to those contained in the Protocol. As long as the substantive requirements of the Protocol are upheld-irrespective of whether export occurs to a Party or a non-party-the actual risk of the export of CO2 for dumping resulting in environmental harm that would not otherwise have occurred is limited. In fact, export may very well enable captured CO2 to be managed more safely and efficiently if the export is prompted by better storage sites and/or higher technical capacity in the State of import compared to that of export. An argument can therefore still be made that the rights of the non-Parties to a new agreement would not suffer in any material sense as a consequence of export for dumping taking place under responsible and well-regulated conditions.
It is conceivable that poor States in particular could be induced to accept dumping, to the detriment of the marine environment, by economic compensation or other benefits (or potentially through some form of coercion). It is also conceivable that an agreement allowing export could, in some cases, particularly with respect to States with weak institutions, be obtained through the provision of inducements to influential individuals. This could result in harm to the marine environment that would not have occurred had the export not taken place. However, these arguments are most pertinent in relation to potential export from developed to developing countries. As long as an agreement only involves States with (presumed) high levels of technological and regulatory capacity, there should be little basis for these types of objections.
It is vital that any new agreement on modifications between a subset of Parties to the Protocol preempts the risk of eroding the general level of environmental protection for which the Protocol should be a guarantor.
Other Options
Of the other options presented in the IEA paper, most run up against the same problem as a subsequent agreement. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if, as far as is relevant here, the negotiating States have in some manner so agreed.107 No formal obstacle to the Parties agreeing on provisional application seems to exist. It should also be clear that not all Parties must agree to such a provisional application for it to become effective with regard to the Parties that do.108 But because of the legal relationship between those States that do apply the (in this case) modification and those Parties to the Protocol that do not, the 'integral' nature of the Protocol may still put the legality of export into question. In this regard the same reasoning as above applies mutatis mutandis.
More or less the same goes for the option of modifying the operation of relevant aspects of the Protocol (i.e., Article 6) as between two or more Parties. This draws on the provisions in Article 41 of the VCLT. It enables two or more parties to a multilateral treaty that does not prohibit such action to conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between them. That requires, as far as is relevant here, that the modification does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty. Any modification must also not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.109 Both the "enjoyment by the other parties of their rights" and "the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty" raise the question of the nature of the obligation not to export and its relation to the overall purpose of the Protocol. The fifth option, suspension of the operation of relevant aspects of the London Protocol as between two or more contracting Parties, runs up against much the same problems as the previous two options. In addition it would, as noted in the IEA paper, signal that the Parties are prepared to set aside the multilaterally agreed obligations in order to pursue their own agenda (although that ultimate objective, if not the actual measure, would find support in action by all the Parties).110 That would probably make it one of the least palatable options.
Conclusion
To summarise, enabling export of captured CO2 is not a problem if consensus can be achieved for, e.g., an interpretative resolution making it clear that construing Article 6 of the Protocol as not prohibiting export of captured CO2 for geological storage, at least not when storage is to occur in another Party to the Protocol, is consistent with the will of the Parties. However, in light of the developments at the Meetings of the Parties so far, this seems rather unlikely to happen. Measures which do not require consensus could also be resorted to. They would not make the legality of export a foregone conclusion, but would at least enable a good argument to be made that the interests of the Parties who did not join such an action, e.g., the adoption of a subsequent agreement or the provisional application of the amendment to Article 6, had not been injured in any substantive way. This would require a high level of certainty that export would not in fact result in CO2 storage operations that do not meet at least the demands of the London Protocol.
